Australia can’t expect Donald Trump to judge its strategic value by historical ties. The focus will be on our willingness to protect ourselves and capacity to contribute to shared strategic interests.
The world is more dangerous today than during the first Trump administration, with competing priorities across Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to do more, spend more and risk more in response to these threats. This would be the case even without Trump in the White House.
Australia’s trade deficit with the United States helped during Trump’s first term, because of the administration’s focus on fair trade. But it was not the only reason for Australia’s success in working with Trump then. We thrived because, coming out of the 2016 Defence White Paper, our defence spending was rising and because we led efforts to counter China’s malign influence.
The new Trump administration will continue to frame China as the pacing threat. Australia and Britain, the US’s partners in AUKUS, seem in some policies to be putting trade with China ahead of long-term security concerns. That won’t be welcomed by Trump’s team, especially if accompanied by any expectation that the US takes on the economic and security risks emanating from China.
Trump has suggested that NATO allies lift defence spending to 5 percent of GDP—more than double the alliance’s existing spending target of 2 percent. This is, in part, intended as a wakeup call to the nine NATO members that do not meet the current target.
These NATO members and other allies such as Australia should lift their defence capabilities not because of fear of Trump but because they face security threats. In an Australian federal election year, economic ministries will argue any lift in defence spending requires careful balancing against the full range of pressures on the budget. This is true.
Australia needs to show Trump a persuasive value proposition around what it’s doing for its own security and, as a result, for regional security and the Australia-US alliance. So, lifting spending on defence and technologies to enhance military and cyber capabilities is the first priority to consider as we look towards a new Trump administration. With almost daily reports about Beijing’s increasing control of the information domain, including through the hacking of US and Australian critical infrastructure, Australia should make addressing Beijing’s malign actions a top-tier joint effort with the Trump administration, using and going beyond AUKUS Pillar 2 on advanced technologies.
The cyber effort should be complemented by greater investment in space security that allows us to burden-share in orbit. The 2024 National Defence Strategy alludes to the importance of space control to counter threats by hostile actors but this domain has seen spending cuts at precisely the wrong time. Similarly, advanced autonomous systems that are low-cost but able to be acquired in high volumes would enhance the Australian Defence Force’s capability and assist US efforts to counter Chinese threats.
The second priority to consider is securing critical supply chains by reducing reliance on China. Focusing on selective technology decoupling from China, the Trump administration is likely to expect Australia to play a leading role in securing resilient supply chains, particularly for critical minerals. Building on its spending on the Future Made in Australia policy, Canberra should consider further developing local processing capabilities, establishing joint ventures with foreign companies, including US companies, and securing diversified long-term supply contracts to reduce reliance on China.
This week we have seen the US make security decisions in these areas, including banning Chinese smart cars. Chinese components in wind and solar panel technology may also be a prioritised concern for the US. The Australian government should make it clear that it supports such decisions and views them in similar terms to 5G policies. It should also signal its intent to similarly prioritise Australia’s national security in these areas, promoting establishment of reliable supply chains and working with the US to gain broader support for them.
Third, we must increase operational support for the US in the Indo-Pacific to counter China’s influence. For our own regional security, Australia should re-align with US efforts to push back—openly, not just privately—on Beijing’s economic coercion, military aggression and abuse of technology. This may require Australia to increase its maritime presence in contested areas such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, potentially in cooperation with India, South Korea or Japan.
Another option would be to widen access arrangements for US military forces to operate from Australian defence facilities, particularly in northern Australia, and accelerate plans for investment in defending those bases against growing missile threats from China. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review recommended an urgent move to deploy missile defence capabilities, including interceptor missiles, but the government failed to act on this recommendation in the 2024 Integrated Investment Program, deferring a decision until the 2026 program.
Fourth, we must use regional mechanisms, such as the Quad and AUKUS, to maintain stability. Australia should lead a recommitment to the Quad’s security interests, downplayed in recent years for fear of upsetting Beijing, and expand the group’s public focus on defence and cyber threats. Australia should also strengthen both pillars of AUKUS, contributing to the success of Pillar 1 through local infrastructure and expertise while ensuring Pillar 2 identifies the capabilities the three nations and their partners need.
Australia shouldn’t act just to please the US or Trump. Good national security policy is good for the Australia-US alliance and our international partnerships. Investing in defence and security means we will always be able to say ‘no’ when a request is not in our interest. By articulating our value commensurate with the worsening geostrategic circumstances, Australia also makes clear we don’t rely on just the US, but on each other.
James Corera is the director of ASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security program. Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst with ASPI. The views expressed in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect the views of Talanoa ‘o Tonga.
Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute